Realism	and	Antirealism1 Randall	Harp Kareem	Khalifa Biographical	Note: Randall	Harp	is	an	Assistant	Professor	of	Philosophy	at	the	University	of	Vermont. His	interests	include	the	philosophy	of	action,	moral	psychology,	and	philosophy	of social	science.	He	has	published	or	forthcoming	articles	in	Journal	of	Moral Philosophy,	Theoria,	and	Routledge	Companion	to	Free	Will. Kareem	Khalifa	is	an	Associate	Professor	of	Philosophy	at	Middlebury	College.	His interests	include	general	philosophy	of	science,	epistemology,	and	philosophy	of social	science.	He	has	published	articles	in	British	Journal	for	the	Philosophy	of Science,	Journal	of	Economic	Methodology,	Philosophy	of	Science,	Philosophy	of	the Social	Sciences,	Social	Epistemology,	Synthese,	and	Theoria,	among	others.	He	is currently	completing	a	book	on	scientific	understanding. This	is	the	penultimate	draft.	The	final	draft	can	be	found	in	A.	Rosenberg	&	L.	C. McIntyre	(Eds.),	Routledge	Companion	to	Philosophy	of	Social	Science.	London: Routledge,	254-269. 2 Introduction Our	best	social	scientific	theories	try	to	tell	us	something	about	the	social	world.	But is	talk	of	a	"social	world"	a	metaphor	that	we	ought	not	take	too	seriously?	In particular,	do	the	denizens	of	the	social	world-cultural	values	like	the	Protestant work	ethic,	firms	like	ExxonMobil,	norms	like	standards	of	dress	and	behavior, institutions	like	the	legal	system,	teams	like	FC	Barcelona,	conventions	like marriages-exist?	The	question	is	not	merely	academic. Social	scientists	use	these different	social	entities	to	explain	social	phenomena	such	as	the	rise	of	capitalism, the	decline	in	oil	prices,	or	the	effect	of	unions	on	the	sports	labor	market. But	how could	these	explanations	possibly	work	if	social	entities	don't	exist? Questions	about	the	existence	of	social	entities	have	implications	for	both philosophical	and	social-scientific	inquiry.	A	central	area	of	philosophy	is ontology-the	study	of	what	exists.	Social	ontology	is	a	relatively	new	field,	and enriches	older	ontological	debates	with	novel	questions	and	broader	concerns.	But the	realism	debate	is	not	exclusively	(or	even	primarily)	about	ontology;	rather, there	is	an	intimate	link	between	these	ontological	questions	and	epistemological concerns	about	how	social-scientific	explanations	should	proceed.	For	instance, whether	social	entities	exist	determines	the	extent	to	which	these	explanations should	emulate	their	natural-scientific	counterparts.	Similar	considerations determine	the	extent	to	which	these	explanations	must	appeal	to	individual	actions. To	navigate	this	intellectual	landscape,	let's	introduce	a	distinction.	A	realist is	anyone	who	believes	that	social	scientists	are	warranted	in	believing	that	social entities	exist;	an	antirealist	is	anybody	who	disagrees.	Different	antirealists	disagree with	realists	for	different	reasons.	Consequently,	we	canvass	five	kinds	of antirealism	below:	explanatory	pessimism,	fictionalism,	eliminativism, reductionism,	and	constructivism. Debates	about	realism	in	the	social	sciences	tend	to	cluster	into	one	of	three categories.	First,	should	we	be	realists	about	the	theoretical	entities	appealed	to	in our	best	social-scientific	theories?	These	debates	parallel	their	counterparts	in	the philosophy	of	natural	science.	Realists	in	the	natural	sciences	argue	that	the predictive,	experimental,	and	technological	success	of	natural-scientific explanations	warrants	belief	in	entities	such	as	quarks	and	gravity.	Similarly,	our most	empirically	successful	explanations	of	poverty,	for	example,	invoke	social strata,	social	structures,	and	economic	policies.	If	such	entities	are	necessary features	of	our	best	explanations,	does	that	entail	that	we	should	be	realists	about such	entities? Realists	argue	that	the	best	way	to	account	for	the	explanatory success	of	our	social	scientific	theories	is	by	being	realists	about	the	entities	posited in	our	theories;	anti-realists	deny	this	claim. Second	are	questions	about	whether	we	should	be	realists	about	groups, where	we	can	understand	groups	roughly	as	a	collection	of	individuals	organized with	some	collective	interest,	goal,	or	characteristic.	Groups	can	range	from	microgroups	consisting	of	a	few	individuals,	to	meso-groups	such	as	corporations,	all	the way	up	to	macro-groups	such	as	nations.	Realists	about	groups	believe	that	groups cannot	be	reduced	to	mere	collections	of	individuals;	antirealists	about	groups	think 2 that	groups	can	be	explained	without	remainder	in	terms	of	the	individuals	who constitute	the	group. Third	are	questions	about	whether	we	should	be	realists	about	the	things that	groups	create.	Entities	such	as	money,	laws,	race,	and	gender	are	"socially constructed,"	in	the	sense	that	their	most	important	properties	depend	on	how	we conceive	of	them.	By	contrast,	natural	properties-the	charge	of	electrons,	the height	of	mountains,	and	the	atomic	weight	of	chemical	elements,	for	instance-are independent	of	how	we	conceive	of	them.	We	might	wonder,	then,	whether	the	fact that	groups	create	social	entities	means	that	they	are	not	real. Realists	about socially	constructed	entities	(such	as	money	or	race)	argue	that	these	entities	could not	function	in	our	lives	and	in	the	world	without	being	real;	antirealists	about socially	constructed	entities	argue	the	contrary.	In	what	follows,	we	look	at	these three	realist	debates,	canvassing	arguments	both	for	and	against	realist	and antirealist	positions. 1. Should	we	believe	what	social	science	tells	us? Social	scientists	are	scientists.	As	such,	they	advance	theories	with	the	aim	of predicting,	explaining,	and	controlling	some	part	of	the	world.	Let	us	say	that theories	that	fulfill	these	aims	are	empirically	successful.	A	theory's	empirical	success is	the	most	compelling	reason	to	believe	that	it	is	(mostly)	true.	If	these	slogans about	science	are	correct,	then,	to	the	extent	that	a	social-scientific	theory	succeeds in	predicting,	explaining,	and	controlling	some	part	of	the	social	world,	we	should	be realists	about	the	social	entities	that	it	posits.	In	what	follows,	we	develop	this	line of	thought	by	discussing	the	central	argument	used	to	vindicate	the	reality	of scientific	entities.	We	then	rehearse	two	prominent	objections	to	that	argument. 1.1. The	Explanatory	Argument A	powerful	argument	for	realism	is	that	the	staggering	level	of	empirical	success	of modern	science	would	be	nothing	short	of	a	miracle	if	its	theories	were	radically false.	For	this	reason,	many	philosophers	and	scientists	are	realists	about	subatomic particles,	curved	space-time,	cells,	species,	natural	selection,	continental	plates,	and so	on.	The	central	idea	is	that	realism	provides	the	best	(if	not	the	only)	explanation of	the	relevant	aspects	of	the	domain.	Indeed,	realists	about	many	other	entities (mathematical	objects,	moral	truths,	etc.)	invoke	this	same	principle	to	defend	their positions.	This	suggests	the	following	"Explanatory	Argument"	for	realism	about social	entities: EA1. If	the	best	explanation	of	the	relevant	facts	posits	social	entities,	then	we should	believe	that	social	entities	exist. EA2. The	best	explanation	of	the	relevant	facts	posits	social	entities. EA3. Therefore,	we	should	believe	that	social	entities	exist. A	few	clarifications	are	in	order.	First,	the	conclusion	(EA3)	amounts	to	realism about	social	entities.	Second,	an	explanation	posits	an	entity	just	in	case	that	entity exists	if	the	explanation	is	true.	The	relevant	facts	are	typically	those	that	most parties	to	a	debate	agree	are	in	need	of	explanation.	A	hypothesis	is	the	best explanation	of	a	fact	if	it	optimizes	the	set	of	criteria	typically	associated	with	our 3 best	theories:	simplicity,	scope,	fit	with	background	knowledge,	predictive	power, and	so	on. Indeed,	with	a	little	bit	of	reconstruction,	we	can	see	that	social	scientists frequently	argue	in	this	manner.	This	is	particularly	clear	when	we	examine	the extensive	work	on	both	qualitative	(King,	Keohane,	and	Verba	1994)	and quantitative	(Blalock	1971)	causal	inference	in	the	social	sciences.	For	instance, suppose	that	the	chief	cause	of	poverty	is	a	federal	policy	that	permits	a	very	low minimum	wage.	Then	that	policy	is	the	best	explanation	of	poverty.	Furthermore, this	explanation	assumes	that	policies	have	causal	efficacy.	However,	non-existent things	can't	have	causal	efficacy.	Consequently,	policies	exist. What	of	non-causal	explanations?	Consider	sociologists'	observation	that	men born	in	lower	socioeconomic	strata	have	a	higher	chance	of	upward	social	mobility than	those	born	in	higher	socioeconomic	strata	(Blau	and	Duncan	1967).	Why	is this?	To	appreciate	the	answer,	consider	Al,	who	is	born	at	a	lower	socioeconomic stratum	than	Bob. If	a	socioeconomic	stratum	is	higher	than	Bob's	current	stratum it	is	also	higher	than	Al's,	but	not	vice	versa.	Hence,	there	are	more	ways	that	Al	can make	an	upward	move.	This	explanation	appears	non-causal,	as	it	only	invokes probabilities	that	fall	out	of	the	"structure"	of	socioeconomic	strata	in	the	United States	(Garfinkel	1981).	Zooming	back	out	to	the	larger	philosophical	picture,	the best	explanation	of	the	observed	correlations	between	social	origins	and	social mobility	posits	social	strata	and	social	structures.	According	to	the	Explanatory Argument,	this	means	that	we	should	believe	that	social	strata	and	social	structures exist. 1.2. Explanatory	Pessimism While	the	Explanatory	Argument	nicely	captures	a	prominent	way	in	which philosophers	and	scientists	(both	social	and	natural)	justify	realism	about theoretical	posits,	it	has	faced	several	objections.	In	particular,	philosophers	have questioned	its	first	premise,	i.e.	that	our	best	explanations	are	an	effective	guide	to what	exists.	For	ease	of	reference,	we	call	anyone	who	raises	this	challenge	an explanatory	pessimist.	Explanatorily	pessimistic	social	scientists	are	somewhat	rare, though	they	typically	are	motivated	by	empiricist	concerns	that	we	only	can	know correlations,	but	cannot	have	causal	knowledge.	Comte	(1868)	and	Mill	(1904)	are early	examples	of	this	critical	stance	towards	social	explanation.	Other	authors criticize	the	reliability	of	certain	kinds	of	explanations,	e.g.	functional	explanations (Elster	2007),	and	hence	might	be	interpreted	as	expressing	qualified	forms	of explanatory	pessimism. By	contrast,	several	natural	scientists	(and	the	philosophers	who	have studied	their	work)	have	argued	that	our	best	explanations	are	not	a	trustworthy guide	to	reality.	For	instance,	Newtonian	mechanics	was	the	best	explanation	of many	phenomena	for	nearly	three	centuries.	However,	the	advent	of	Einsteinian	and quantum	mechanics	in	the	early	20th	century	revealed	that	Newton's	account	was mistaken.	Consequently,	it	would	appear	that	the	Explanatory	Argument	has	given us	bad	advice:	we	should	not	have	believed	that	Newtonian	space,	time,	gravity,	and energy	exist. 4 Similar	examples	can	be	found	in	the	social	sciences.	Consider	Oscar	Lewis' (1975)	once-prominent	explanation	of	poverty.	Looking	at	five	Mexican	families with	different	socioeconomic	outcomes,	Lewis	reasoned	that	the	poorer	families have	a	different	value	system	(a	"culture	of	poverty")	than	their	more	affluent counterparts,	and	that	this	value	system	prevents	them	from	taking	the	measures needed	to	improve	their	socioeconomic	status.	As	the	explanation	gained	further corroboration,	it	had	a	good	deal	of	prominence	by	the	end	of	the	1970s,	and	figured prominently	in	policy	decisions	about	social	assistance.	Hence,	it	was	taken	by	many to	be	the	best	explanation	of	poverty.	As	such,	the	Explanatory	Argument	counsels us	to	believe	in	the	existence	of	a	culture	of	poverty. Yet,	throughout	the	1980s,	as	finer-grained	empirical	measures	of	culture developed,	and	a	wider	variety	of	impoverished	populations	were	studied,	it	became clear	that	the	cultural	variation	among	the	poor	was	too	great	for	this	explanation	to be	true.	As	before,	it	would	appear	that	the	Explanatory	Argument	has	given	us	bad advice:	we	should	not	have	believed	in	the	culture	of	poverty.	Nor	is	this	example	an outlier;	many	explanations	in	the	social	sciences	enjoy	some	notoriety,	only	to	face searching	empirical	difficulties	at	a	later	date. Antirealists	use	examples	such	as	this	to	critique	the	Explanatory	Argument. On	one	version,	the	so-called	"Pessimistic	Induction"	(Laudan	1981),	the	best explanation	at	any	given	time	is	frequently	rejected	at	a	subsequent	point	in	history. Consequently,	we	should	not	believe	that	our	best	explanations	posit	real	entities, since	they	are	likely	to	be	replaced	in	the	future.	Hence,	on	this	view,	"best explanation"	means	"best	for	its	time."	On	this	formulation,	Lewis'	explanation	was the	best,	posited	a	social	entity	(the	culture	of	poverty),	but	we	should	not	believe that	this	social	entity	exists.	This	falsifies	the	first	premise	of	the	Explanatory Argument. Alternatively,	and	closely	related,	some	antirealists	argue	that	our explanation	may	only	be	the	best	of	a	bad	lot,	in	which	case,	we	should	not	believe that	it	posits	real	entities	(Stanford	2006;	van	Fraassen	1989).	This	view	can	simply be	a	variant	of	the	Pessimistic	Induction.	Alternatively,	it	may	motivate	skepticism about	our	ability	to	identify	the	best	explanation,	even	if	such	an	explanation justifies	realism.	On	this	view,	the	best	explanation	of	poverty	may	posit	a	culture	of poverty,	but	we	cannot	know	that	this	explanation	is	better	than	the	rest. There	are	reasons	to	think	that	these	objections	to	the	Explanatory	Argument are	especially	thorny	in	the	philosophy	of	social	science.	For	instance,	many	realists have	responded	to	these	pessimist	challenges	by	claiming	that	our	best	explanations only	entail	belief	in	posits	that	are	indispensable	to	novel	predictions	(Psillos	1999; Worrall	1989)	or	experimental	interventions	(Hacking	1983).	Since	these demanding	kinds	of	empirical	success	are	far	less	common	in	the	social	sciences than	in	the	natural	sciences,	explanatory	pessimism	in	the	social	sciences	may	be even	more	persuasive	than	its	natural-scientific	cousin.	Having	said	this,	some	have suggested	that	social-scientific	hypotheses	also	contain	these	high-grade	posits (Kincaid	2008),	and	so	realism	about	social	entities	is	on	par	with	realism	about natural-scientific	entities. 1.3. Fictionalism 5 Frequently,	non-philosophers	find	these	debates	about	realism	to	be	"pointless"	or "merely	academic."	On	such	a	view,	it	simply	does	not	matter	if	social	entities	exist or	not.	There	are	more	and	less	principled	ways	to	make	this	point.	A	fairly sophisticated	one	comes	from	fictionalists.	Like	explanatory	pessimists,	fictionalists object	to	the	first	premise	of	the	Explanatory	Argument.	However,	whereas explanatory	pessimists	are	largely	concerned	with	showing	why	we	cannot	know much	on	the	basis	of	our	best	explanations,	fictionalists	emphasize	that	we	can	still use	our	best	explanations	in	the	absence	of	this	knowledge.	Fictionalists	can	thereby articulate	the	principles	behind	the	complaint	that	the	realism	debate	is	"pointless:" it	does	not	matter	if	realism	is	true,	for	it	is	enough	to	treat	social	entities	as	useful fictions.	More	precisely,	even	if	our	best	explanations	posit	social	entities,	we	can still	use	those	explanations	without	believing	that	posited	social	entities	exist. Typical	"uses"	include	explanation,	prediction,	control,	and	model	construction.	For instance,	based	on	Blau	and	Duncan's	work,	subsequent	scholars	have	found	it useful	to	explain	social	mobility	in	terms	of	social	strata	and	social	structures. However,	fictionalists	point	out	that	all	of	this	is	compatible	with	agnosticism	about these	social	entities. While	many	social	scientists	express	fictionalist	commitments	(e.g.,	Friedman 1953;	MacDonald	2003),	only	a	few	philosophers	are	fictionalists	about	social entities	(Demeter	(2013)	and	Turner	(2003)	present	fictionalist	accounts	of psychological	states	and	social	entities,	respectively.)	However,	the	resources	for	a more	thoroughgoing	fictionalism	are	easy	to	find.	Van	Fraassen's	(1980) constructive	empiricism	is	a	fictionalism	that	appears	to	apply	to	all	science,	though its	chief	applications	have	been	in	the	natural	sciences.	Van	Fraassen	is	a	fictionalist about	unobservable	entities	in	science:	he	holds	that	we	can	use	or	accept	posits about	unobservable	entities	without	believing	that	those	entities	exist.	In	other words,	we	can	treat	posits	about	unobservables	as	useful	fictions	(e.g.	for	the purposes	of	prediction	and	explanation.)	This	can	be	applied	to	the	social	sciences, for	the	unobservable-observable	distinction	cuts	across	the	natural	and	social domains.	For	instance,	subatomic	particles,	beliefs,	and	social	norms	all	appear	to resist	any	direct	observation.	However,	fictionalists	of	this	sort	then	inherit	all	of	the challenges	to	van	Fraassen's	view.	For	instance,	some	have	wondered	whether	a distinction	between	observable	and	unobservable	entities	is	sustainable (Churchland	1985;	Hacking	1985).	Arguably,	this	distinction	is	even	more	vexed	in the	social	sciences	(Block	1976). To	summarize,	we	have	seen	that	realists	deploy	the	Explanatory	Argument to	justify	their	position.	Such	a	view	holds	that	we	should	be	realists	about	entities posited	by	our	best	explanations.	Antirealist	criticisms	come	in	two	broad	varieties. First,	explanatory	pessimists	question	the	extent	to	which	we	can	trust	our	best explanations	as	a	guide	to	what	is	real.	Second,	fictionalists	argue	that	it	is	enough	to use	the	posits	of	our	best	explanations,	even	if	we	do	not	think	that	they	are	real. Before	proceeding,	a	word	of	caution	is	in	order.	The	Explanatory	Argument presupposes	that	the	social	sciences	ought	to	emulate	the	natural	sciences. Specifically,	it	presupposes	that	realism	about	social	entities	is	justified	(and perhaps	only	justified)	by	social-scientific	theories'	success	in	predicting,	explaining, 6 and	controlling	the	empirically	testable	parts	of	the	social	world.	Indeed,	even	the critics	of	the	Explanatory	Argument	assume	this	much	of	the	time. However,	there	is	a	longstanding	debate	as	to	whether	the	social	sciences have	different	aims	than	the	natural	sciences.	On	this	view,	successful	social	theories need	not	be	highly	explanatory	or	predictive,	but	should	instead	furnish	fruitful interpretations	and	give	us	a	richer	understanding	of	the	people	studied.	This	has led	some	philosophers	to	argue	that	because	different	sciences	have	fundamentally different	methodologies,	the	entities	in	those	sciences'	respective	domains	are	real or	exist	in	different	ways	(Dupré	1993;	Root	2000;	Sundstrom	2002).	On	such	a view,	our	beliefs	in	social	entities'	existence	are	subject	to	different	standards	than our	beliefs	in	the	existence	of	natural-scientific	objects.	By	contrast,	others	argue that	precisely	because	interpretation	and	understanding	are	more	inquirer-relative than	the	explanation,	prediction,	and	control	characteristic	of	the	natural	sciences, realism	about	social	entities	is	more	difficult	to	defend	than	its	natural-scientific counterpart	(Reed	2008). 2. Are	Social	Groups	Real? Both	explanatory	pessimists	and	fictionalists	criticize	the	first	premise	of	the Explanatory	Argument	(EA1),	which	states	that	if	our	best	explanations	posit	social entities,	then	we	should	be	realists	about	those	entities.	However,	many philosophers	and	social	scientists	have	also	challenged	the	second	premise	of	this argument	(EA2),	which	states	that	our	best	explanations	posit	social	entities.	For instance,	we	might	wonder	whether	our	best	explanations	of	poverty	really	posit policies,	social	strata,	or	a	culture	of	poverty,	or	if	instead	they	only	posit	the individuals	who	are	described	by	these	social	terms. This	concern	shows	up	most	clearly	in	discussions	about	the	reality	of	social groups.	Some	find	the	idea	of	social	groups	standing	over	and	above	the	individuals that	constitute	them	to	be	spooky,	and	also	find	the	methods	of	studying	these groups	to	be	unscientific.	While	these	sorts	of	concerns	are	at	least	as	old	as	Mill (1904)	and	Weber	(1978),	there	is	also	a	long	tradition	of	defending	the	integrity	of social	groups	and	the	distinctive	methodology	of	the	social	sciences,	e.g.	Durkheim (2013).	Contemporary	heirs	to	Mill	and	Weber	argue	that	"macro-level"	social explanations	must	be	grounded	in	"micro-foundations"	that	appeal	only	to individuals	(Elster	2007;	Hedström	2005);	others	demur	(Colander	1996). To	that	end,	let's	assess	the	following	"Group	Variant"	of	the	Explanatory Argument: GV1. If	the	best	explanation	of	the	relevant	facts	posits	social	groups,	then	we should	believe	that	social	groups	exist. GV2. The	best	explanation	of	the	relevant	facts	posits	social	groups. GV3. Therefore,	we	should	believe	that	social	groups	exist. As	an	example,	consider	why	democracies	tend	not	to	fight	wars	with	each	other. Suppose	that	two	democracies	are	in	a	dispute.	Because	losing	a	war	has	dire electoral	consequences,	both	can	anticipate	that	going	to	war	will	lead	each	to allocate	large	amounts	of	resources	to	a	risky	situation.	Because	of	this,	engaging	in war	is	an	unattractive	option,	as	neither	democracy	is	assured	an	easy	victory	(de Mesquita	et	al.	1999).	As	should	be	clear,	this	explanation	posits	social	groups 7 (democracies	or	electorates).	So,	according	to	this	argument,	we	should	infer	that these	groups	exist. We	will	call	those	who	subscribe	to	this	argument	group	realists.	Those opposed	to	group	realism	have	two	potential	strategies.	First,	they	can	challenge GV1,	in	which	case	they	pursue	the	explanatory	pessimist	and	fictionalist	strategies above.	Alternatively,	they	can	challenge	GV2.	To	that	end,	it's	useful	to	first	consider the	arguments	in	favor	of	GV2.	(We	address	objections	to	GV2	below.) First,	group	realists	emphasize	that	talk	of	groups	is	pervasive	in	our ordinary	discourse:	we	predicate	things	of	groups	("Americans	are	materialistic"); we	attribute	mental	states	to	groups	("The	Cato	Institute	believes	in	free	markets and	individual	liberty");	and	we	conceive	of	groups	as	unitary	agents	capable	of acting	in	the	world	("ExxonMobil	intends	to	grow	its	worldwide	crude	and	natural gas	production	by	7.5%"). Group	membership	figures	in	racial,	ethnic,	or	religious group	affiliation,	and	thereby	plays	a	prominent	role	in	our	sense	of	identity. And groups	need	not	be	large,	or	institutional;	some	theorists	argue	that	groups	as	small as	two	people	are	the	fundamental	elements	of	social	reality	(Gilbert	1989). Moreover,	the	social	sciences	follow	ordinary	language	in	their	use	of	groups as	explanatory	concepts. Sociologists	appeal	to	group-based	concepts	such	as	social institutions,	organizations,	states,	societies,	and	cultures,	while	economists	appeal	to such	things	as	firms	and	networks. As	should	be	clear	from	our	discussion	of democratic	peace,	social	scientists	use	groups	to	explain	(individual	and	collective) behavior. Some	social	scientists	also	use	groups	to	account	for	the	nature	of	social reality	(Berger	and	Luckmann	1991). On	a	cursory	examination	of	social	scientific practice,	it	would	appear	that	GV2	is	clearly	true. However,	while	nearly	everyone	agrees	that	social	scientists	appear	to	make use	of	groups	in	their	theories,	some	argue	that	this	appearance	is	misleading. Certain	critics	of	group	realism,	whom	we	will	call	eliminativists,	hold	that	our	talk to	social	groups	is	false	when	taken	literally	(Quinton	1975)1.	Other	critics	of realism,	whom	we	will	call	reductionists,	hold	that	the	use	of	social	groups	in	our theorizing	is	dispensable:	talk	of	social	groups	can	always	be	translated	into	talk	of the	individuals	that	constitute	the	group. If	either	of	these	positions	is	correct,	then our	best	explanations	do	not	require	us	to	posit	social	entities,	and	so	GV2	would	be false.	In	what	follows,	we	examine	these	two	alternatives	to	group	realism. 2.1. Eliminativism Eliminativists	think	that	there	are	no	such	things	as	groups;	rather,	there	are	only individuals	interacting	with	other	individuals. This	claim	was	memorably	stated	by British	Prime	Minister	Margaret	Thatcher	(1987),	who	said: ...and	so	they	are	casting	their	problems	on	society	and	who	is	society?	There is	no	such	thing!	There	are	individual	men	and	women	and	there	are	families. (Of	course,	for	Thatcher	to	be	a	proper	eliminativist,	she	would	also	have	to	say	that there	are	no	families.) 1	While	we	are	referring	to	eliminativism	about	social	entities,	"eliminativism" frequently	refers	to	an	analogous	position	about	individual	mental	states	(beliefs, desires,	etc.)	in	the	philosophy	of	psychology. 8 While	eliminativists	hold	that	claims	invoking	group	concepts	are	false, eliminativists	also	maintain	that	true	statements	about	individuals	can	replace	these falsehoods.	Thus,	the	claim	that	Americans	are	materialistic	would	be	replaced	by	a claim	to	the	effect	that	most	of	the	individuals	who	are	American	citizens	are materialistic. On	the	face	of	it,	eliminativism	is	counterintuitive.	After	all,	eliminativists would	have	to	hold	that	a	claim	of	the	form	"FC	Barcelona	won	the	Champions League	in	2015"	is,	strictly	speaking,	false;	to	be	true,	the	claim	should	be reinterpreted	so	that	it	has	the	form	"Xavi	and	Iniesta	and	Messi	and	Neymar	and etc.	won	the	Champions	League." But	regardless	of	what	we	want	to	say	about	that second	claim,	it	seems	wrong	to	say	that	FC	Barcelona	did	not	win	the	Champions League,	on	the	grounds	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as	FC	Barcelona. Why,	then,	is	eliminativism	a	plausible	view? Some	think	that methodological	individualism	entails	eliminativism,	and	so	they	find	eliminativism plausible	because	they	find	methodological	individualism	plausible	(Tuomela	1990). That	argument,	however,	appears	unsound.	Methodological	individualism	requires that	claims	about	collective	entities	be	grounded	in	claims	about	the	actions	and properties	of	individuals,	but	that	is	consistent	with	collective	entities'	existence. So,	one	can	be	a	methodological	individualist	without	also	being	an	eliminativist. (For	more	on	methodological	individualism,	read	the	chapter	on	methodological individualism	in	this	volume.) Eliminativists	must	hold	a	stronger	view. First,	eliminativists	must	hold	that only	those	things	that	factor	into	our	best	explanations	determine	what	exists;	and second,	that	none	of	our	best	explanations	appeal	to	groups.	These	claims	are	strong, because	social	groups	are	featured	in	legitimate	explanations	all	the	time.	Consider the	following	explanation	of	why	more	committed	sports	fans	are	likelier	to	be violent	after	their	team's	loss	than	less	committed	fans:	whereas	wins	by	a	sports team	enhance	the	social	identity	and	self-esteem	of	all	fans,	losses	only	decrease	the psychological	well-being	of	those	fans	who	most	strongly	identify	with	the	team. Strongly	identified	fans	then	act	aggressively	in	order	to	regain	that	well-being (Wann	et	al.	2001).	If	we	paraphrase	away	the	football	club	to	be	instead	about	the individual	members,	the	explanation	no	longer	identifies	the	main	causes	of spectator	aggression. After	all,	membership	of	a	team	can	change	without	a	change in	fan	identification,	and	some	people	can	strongly	identify	with	a	team	without knowing	all	of	its	individual	members. Eliminativist	arguments	might	work	for	establishing	that	particular	kinds	of social	groups	are	not	real.	Consider	groups	such	as	"unwed	mothers	between	the ages	of	18	and	30"	and	"individuals	who	self-identify	as	Jewish."	These	are	examples of	groups	such	that	possessing	some	set	of	properties	is	necessary	and	sufficient	for membership	in	the	group.	While	these	groups	sometimes	seem	to	contribute	to social	scientific	explanations,	the	eliminativist	would	argue	that	the	group	functions in	an	explanation	only	insofar	as	the	membership	in	the	group	highlights	the	causal factors	that	actually	play	an	explanatory	role. Because	each	of	the	individuals	who make	up	the	group	possesses	the	properties	that	define	the	group,	it	will	be	those properties	that	are	doing	the	explanatory	work;	the	group	is	doing	no	work	at	all. 9 2.2. Reductionism A	third	position,	reductionism,	falls	in	between	eliminativism	and	group	realism.	A quick	note	about	the	term	"reductionism:"	in	certain	discussions,	reductionism	is synonymous	with	eliminativism.	The	reason	for	this	conflation	is	understandable,	as reductionists	agree	with	eliminativists	that	our	best	explanations	do	not	posit	social groups,	i.e.	they	also	deny	GV2.	Specifically,	any	of	our	best	explanations	that purport	to	posit	social	groups	are	really	just	shorthand	for	individualistic explanations.	Moreover,	individualistic	factors	are	doing	the	real	work	in	these explanations.	However,	like	group	realists,	reductionists	hold	that	social	groups exist.	So,	following	the	philosophical	mainstream,	we	will	distinguish	reductionism from	eliminativism. Two	crucial	claims	justify	reductionists'	claim	that	social	groups	exist.	First, reductionists	assume	that	individuals	exist.	Second,	and	more	controversially,	they argue	that	social	groups	are	nothing	over	and	above	the	individuals	that	comprise them.	From	these	two	claims,	it	follows	trivially	that	social	groups	exist.	The triviality	of	this	inference	means	that	social	groups	don't	exist	in	any	"robust"	or "substantive"	sense.	Thus,	social	groups	are	dispensable	or	redundant	given information	about	the	individuals	who	comprise	them.	For	this	reason,	reductionists are	sometimes	called	"redundant	realists"	(List	and	Pettit	2011). However,	reductionists	differ	from	group	realists	in	the	explanatory	roles they	accord	to	social	groups.	Reductionists	hold	that	individuals	are	ontologically fundamental	while	also	allowing	that	statements	about	groups	need	not	be	strictly speaking	false. Since	reductionists	hold	that	groups	are	not	essential	to	our explanatory	aims,	and	since	all	statements	about	groups	can	be	translated	to statements	about	individuals	but	not	vice	versa,	reductionists	deny	that	the	best explanation	of	social	phenomena	requires	us	to	posit	social	entities-we	can	make do	with	individual	entities	instead. Like	eliminativism,	reductionism	faces	several	challenges.	For	one	thing, reductionists	must	account	for	the	functional	structure	of	social	institutions. Social institutions	are	multiply	realized	in	the	behavior	of	individuals,	meaning	the institution	itself	can	act	in	the	same	way	even	when	the	behavior	of	the	constituent individuals	is	different.	Consider	the	explanation	of	democratic	peace	from	above. When	we	try	to	understand	how	the	electorate	influences	the	decisions	of democratic	leaders,	a	description	of	individual	votes	doesn't	matter;	what	matters	is a	description	of	the	voting	of	the	electorate	as	a	whole.	If	this	is	so,	then	explanatory claims	which	appeal	to	the	social	institution	at	the	group	level	will	work	differently than	explanatory	claims	which	appeal	to	the	social	institution	at	the	individual	level: group-level	claims	explain	in	virtue	of	the	structural	relationship	between	the members,	while	individual-level	claims	explain	in	virtue	of	the	properties	of	the individuals	themselves	(Kincaid	1986). Finally,	reductionism	fails	to	explain	how	social	groups	can	act	as	unitary agents,	i.e.	how	firms,	institutions,	and	the	like	intend	to	do	things,	perform	actions, and	hold	action-relevant	beliefs	and	desires. Indeed,	List	and	Pettit	(2011)	argue that	group	agents	necessarily	possess	action-relevant	mental	states	that	cannot	be reduced	to	individual	mental	states.	Similarly,	Gilbert	(1989)	argues	that	group 10 mental	states	have	a	distinctive	normative	component	that	cannot	be	generated	by individually	held	mental	states. 3. Can	Things	be	Real	and	"Constructed"? Many	social	scientists	(and	some	philosophers)	describe	themselves	as	"social constructivists"	(e.g.,	Berger	and	Luckmann	1991).	However,	there	is	significant disagreement	as	to	what	this	doctrine	entails,	whether	it	is	defensible,	and	if	it	is incompatible	with	realism.	For	instance,	many	social	scientists	equivocate	between reality	itself	depending	on	social	conditions,	interests,	and	the	like,	and	the	more modest	claim	that	our	representations	of	reality	exhibit	this	social	dependence.	Any careful	formulation	of	the	former	is	very	difficult	to	defend.	By	contrast,	the	latter	is compatible	with	there	being	a	world	with	a	structure	that	is	independent	of	these representations,	i.e.	it	is	compatible	with	realism	(Boghossian	2006).	More	qualified forms	of	constructivism	claim	that	social	scientists,	as	the	foremost	experts	on society,	play	a	special	role	in	constructing	social	entities.	For	instance,	MacKenzie, Muniesa,	and	Siu	(2007)	claim	that	economists	make	(i.e.	construct)	the	markets that	they	study. For	our	purposes,	we	will	treat	constructivists	as	a	distinct	kind	of	antirealist. To	get	a	sense	of	the	debate	between	realists	and	constructivists,	consider	three statements: Vertebrate:	Chris	and	Pat	are	vertebrates. Marriage:	Chris	and	Pat	are	married. Cute:	Chris	and	Pat	are	cute. Intuitively,	Vertebrate	is	true	in	some	"objective"	sense,	and	Cute	is	only	true	in some	"subjective"	sense.	In	principle,	moderate	realists	and	moderate constructivists	can	agree	on	these	points.	The	disagreement	concerns	claims	such	as Marriage.	Are	these	contested	claims	more	"objective"	like	Vertebrate	or	more "subjective"	like	Cute?	To	make	any	progress,	we	need	to	get	clearer	on	what "objectivity"	and	"subjectivity"	mean	in	these	contexts.	To	do	this,	we	first	examine the	constructivist's	claim	that	social	entities	"depend"	on	us,	and	then	turn	to	the kind	of	objectivity	at	stake	in	the	realist-constructivist	debates. 3.1. Kinds	of	dependence Regardless	of	any	further	differences,	all	social	constructivists	hold	that	a constructed	entity	"depends"	on	something	social	in	some	way	for	its	existence. More	precisely,	constructivist	claims	always	involves	two	entities.	The	first	is	what we	will	call	the	dependent	entity.	We	will	focus	on	cases	in	which	the	dependent entity	is	a	social	entity.	In	our	example,	Chris	and	Pat's	marriage	is	the	dependent entity.	The	second	is	the	constructing	entity,	i.e.	the	entity	on	which	the	dependent entity	depends.	Necessarily,	constructing	entities	have	to	be	social	or	psychological entities.	Presumably,	the	constructing	entities	in	our	example	are	the	marriage	laws in	Chris	and	Pat's	community. It	is	precisely	the	dependence	on	constructing	entities	that	is	supposed	to preclude	dependent	entities	from	being	real.	Consequently,	we	must	specify	what this	dependence	entails,	and	how	it	bears	on	realism.	To	that	end,	we	must distinguish	two	central	kinds	of	dependence	that	figure	in	the	constructivist 11 literature	(though	see	Sveinsdóttir	(forthcoming)	for	a	more	nuanced	taxonomy	of constructions).	First,	there	is	causal	dependence: F	causally	depends	on	an	individualistic/social	entity	G	if	and	only	if	F	would never	have	come	into	existence,	or	would	have	been	substantially	different, had	G	not	existed. While	our	chief	concern	is	with	constructed	social	entities,	many	causally constructed	entities	are	not	social	entities.	For	instance,	some	elements,	such	as Rutherfordium,	can	only	be	created	in	laboratories,	and	hence	causally	depend	on scientists'	intention	to	synthesize	such	elements.	However,	elements	are paradigmatic	examples	of	physical	(non-social)	entities.	More	broadly,	all	artifacts are	causally	constructed.	For	instance,	a	manufacturer's	intending	to	produce	a bicycle	is	a	cause	of	that	bicycle's	existence. There	is	widespread	consensus	that	causally	constructed	entities	are	real. Bicycles	are	causally	dependent	entities,	and	we	have	no	more	reason	to	be antirealists	about	bicycles	than	Rutherfordium	and	other	natural-scientific	entities. Thus,	insofar	as	social	entities	are	simply	the	effects	of	people's	mental	states	and actions,	then	there	is	no	reason	to	treat	them	as	any	less	real	than	other	artifacts. However,	there	is	good	reason	to	think	that	some	social	entities,	such	as marriage,	are	not	merely	causally	constructed.	This	is	because	marriage	exhibits	a different	kind	of	dependence: F	constitutively	depends	on	individualistic/social	entity	G	if	and	only	if	the continued	existence	of	G	is	a	necessary	condition	for	the	continued	existence of	F. Causally	dependent	entities	can	continue	to	exist	even	after	the	entities	that constructed	them	have	ceased	to	exist.	By	contrast,	constitutively	dependent	entities cannot.	To	make	this	vivid,	consider	the	status	of	constructed	entities	if	every human	were	to	disappear	spontaneously:	bicycles	would	continue	to	exist; marriages	would	not. While	realism	about	causally	constructed	entities	is	generally	accepted, realism	about	constitutively	constructed	entities	is	more	controversial.	Some authors	are	realists	about	these	entities	(Haslanger	2012).	Their	argument	proceeds in	two	steps.	First,	against	those	who	think	that	marriage	is	more	like	cuteness,	they deny	that	there	is	a	good	inference	from	"x	is	mind-dependent"	to	"x	is	not	real" (Haslanger	2012;	Rosen	1994).	Second,	they	use	the	Explanatory	Argument	from above,	but	the	relevant	posits	are	constitutively	dependent	entities.	For	instance, some	hold	that	race	and	gender	play	prominent	explanatory	roles	in	social	inquiry, and	hence	are	real,	even	though	they	are	constitutively	dependent	on	certain	social conditions.	This	would	suggest	the	following	"Constitutive	Variant"	of	the Explanatory	Argument: CV1. If	the	best	explanation	of	the	relevant	facts	posits	constitutively dependent	entities,	then	we	should	believe	that	constitutively	dependent entities	exist. CV2. The	best	explanation	of	the	relevant	facts	posits	constitutively	dependent entities. C. Therefore,	we	should	believe	that	constitutively	dependent	entities	exist. 12 Realists	of	this	persuasion	might	argue	in	the	following	manner.	Marriage	is constitutively	dependent.	Moreover,	our	best	explanations	posit	marriage	as	a central	determinant	of,	e.g.,	psychological	well-being	(Gove,	Hughes,	and	Style 1983).	Consequently,	we	ought	to	believe	that	marriage	exists. However,	there	are	at	least	three	objections	to	this	argument.	First,	since constitutively	dependent	entities	are	simply	a	kind	of	social	entity,	the	same objections	to	the	Explanatory	Argument	apply	to	its	Constitutive	Variant.	Hence,	if explanatory	pessimism,	fictionalism,	eliminativism,	or	reductionism	is	correct	about social	entities	in	general,	they	also	apply	to	constitutively	dependent	entities. Second,	the	Constitutive	Variant	Argument	might	prove	too	much.	For	instance, it	is	unclear	why	cuteness	is	not	constitutively	dependent	upon	people's	attitudes and	emotions.	Moreover,	cuteness	might	well	figure	in	some	of	our	best explanations,	e.g.	of	the	popularity	of	puppy	memes	on	the	Internet.	However,	as	we have	already	suggested,	realism	about	cuteness	is	implausible.	While	some	realists have	bitten	this	bullet	(Haslanger	2012),	others	would	take	this	as	evidence	that	the first	premise	of	the	argument	(CV1)	is	incorrect. Third,	it	appears	that	explanations	only	invoking	constitutively	constructing entities	can	always	"screen	off"	or	"preempt"	any	explanation	of	which	their corresponding	constitutively	dependent	entity	is	a	part.	As	a	result,	the	second premise	(CV2)	of	this	argument	can	be	contested.	For	instance,	puppies'	cuteness	is constitutively	dependent	upon	our	attitudes	about	them.	Consequently,	it	seems	as if	we	could	just	as	well	explain	the	prevalence	of	Internet	puppy	memes	by appealing	to	these	attitudes,	rather	than	adding	another	property-cuteness-into our	ontologies.	Similarly,	although	attitudes	about	race	and	gender	explain	various social	outcomes,	this	does	not	entail	that	race	and	gender	are	real	or	explanatory.	In other	words,	to	the	extent	that	an	entity	is	constitutively	constructed,	it	is	unlikely to	play	the	kind	of	role	in	our	best	explanations	that	licenses	ontological commitment. 3.2. Objectivity Another	way	of	refining	the	Explanatory	Argument	so	that	it	underwrites	realism about	constitutively	dependent	entities	is	to	identify	further	criteria	that	distinguish real	constitutive	constructions-such	as	race	and	gender-from	other	kinds	of constitutively	dependent	entities-such	as	cuteness.	Here,	we	might	(loosely)	follow John	Searle's	(1995)	suggestion	that	even	if	the	existence	of	certain	social	entities depends	on	attitudes	and	social	conditions,	our	judgments	about	those	entities might	be	no	less	objective	than	our	judgments	about	natural-scientific	entities. For	instance,	consider	once	again	the	statement	that	Chris	and	Pat	are married.	Marriages	are	constitutively	dependent	entities:	the	marriage	of	two people	only	exists	insofar	as	it	is	appropriately	held	to	exist	by	the	legal	structures of	the	society	in	which	the	participants	live.	Nevertheless,	there	is	a	fact	of	the matter	about	whether	Chris	and	Pat	are	married,	such	as	the	recognized	laws	about marriage,	and	whether	the	procedures	required	by	those	laws	were	properly followed.	More	generally, F	is	epistemically	objective	if	and	only	if	it	is	possible	to	hold	that	something is	an	F	and	be	wrong. 13 Here,	the	"holder"	(i.e.	constructing	entities)	can	either	be	an	individual	or	a	group. As	should	be	clear,	some	entities,	such	as	vertebrates,	are	epistemically	objective.	It is	possible	for	somebody	to	be	mistaken	about	who	or	what	is	a	vertebrate. Moreover,	we	can	also	see	why	some	social	entities	are	epistemically	objective.	For instance,	suppose	that	Chris	and	Pat	are	a	legally	married	same-sex	couple.	Because of	his	religious	beliefs,	Frank	may	believe	that	Chris	and	Pat	are	not	married. However,	Frank's	religious	beliefs	do	not	nullify	Chris	and	Pat's	marriage.	Similarly, at	first	remove,	no	single	individual's	beliefs	about	race,	gender,	marriage, employment,	income,	etc.	are	capable	of	nullifying	empirical	statements	about	these social	entities. By	contrast,	judgments	about	cuteness	function	differently	in	our	cognitive lives.	They	are	epistemically	subjective.	In	particular,	the	truth	of	(nontrivial) judgments	about	cuteness	depends	on	the	mental	states	of	the	person	judging something	to	be	cute.	In	other	words: A	group	or	person's	holding	that	a	puppy	is	cute	entails	that	the	puppy	is cute. The	Searlean	realist	claims	that	cuteness	is	in	the	eye	of	the	beholder,	while	many claims	about	social	entities	such	as	marriage	are	not.	How	does	this	bear	on	social constructivism?	While	accounts	of	epistemic	objectivity	claim	that	"holders"	are either	individuals	or	groups,	social	constructivists	will	typically	favor	an	account	of epistemic	subjectivity	that	regards	holders	as	social	groups: F	is	epistemically	subjective	if	and	only	if	some	group's	holding	that something	is	an	F	entails	its	being	an	F. (Note:	our	discussion	of	epistemic	subjectivity	and	objectivity	is	indebted,	but	not identical,	to	Searle's	account.)	As	noted	above,	it	is	implausible	that	an	individual, such	as	Frank,	can	nullify	a	marriage.	By	contrast,	certain	social	groups	or	their proxies-such	as	a	legislature	or	a	judge-can	nullify	a	marriage.	Hence,	the constructivist's	position	poses	an	interesting	challenge	for	realists	about constitutively	dependent	entities. To	summarize,	both	realists	and	constructivists	might	agree	that	some	social entity	is	constitutively	constructed.	However,	realists	will	claim	that	the	entity	is epistemically	objective	(and	hence	more	like	Vertebrate),	while	constructivists	will claim	that	it	is	epistemically	subjective	(and	hence	more	like	Cute).	For	instance, constructivists	will	claim	that	judgments	about	membership	in	racial	groups	depend on	some	social	group	making	that	judgment. How	do	we	adjudicate	between	these	competing	claims?	In	the	context	of	the social	sciences,	the	defensibility	of	this	kind	of	constructivism	hinges	(in	part)	on	the specific	methods	that	are	used	to	make	judgments	about	the	social	entity	in question.	For	instance,	some	interpretive	methodologies	are	sufficiently	reflexive that	social	scientists'	intuitions,	feelings,	beliefs,	etc.	necessarily	figure	in	their judgments	about	social	entities	(Bourdieu	and	Wacquant	1992;	Denzin	2001;	Wylie 1994).	Insofar	as	these	methods	are	the	only	or	best	means	of	acquiring	knowledge about	certain	social	entities,	constructivism	cum	epistemic	subjectivism	is	relatively straightforward. By	contrast,	some	methods-particularly	those	that	are	shared	with	the natural	sciences-purport	to	be	answerable	to	a	set	of	mind-independent	empirical 14 facts.	These	include	observation,	measurement,	statistical	analysis,	and	causal inference.	If	these	methods	do	what	they	purport	to	do,	then	constructivism	about the	judgments	that	they	justify	would	appear	misplaced.	However,	some	have advanced	this	particularly	ambitious	brand	of	constructivism	about	social	entities (Law	2004),	by	appealing	to	constructivists	about	natural-scientific	entities	who deny	the	objectivity	of	these	methods	(Bloor	1976;	Kuhn	1996;	Latour	1987;	Latour and	Woolgar	1986;	Pickering	1984,	1995). So,	to	summarize,	the	debate	between	constructivists	and	realists	about social	entities	is	not	a	debate	about	entities	that	are	causally	dependent	on	social conditions.	Otherwise,	Rutherfordium	would	be	socially	constructed.	Rather,	it	is	a debate	about	constitutively	constructed	entities.	However,	some	constitutively constructed	entities,	such	as	cuteness,	do	not	seem	to	warrant	realist	treatment.	So, when	realists	and	constructivists	disagree	about	constitutively	dependent	entities, the	real	sticking	point	is	whether	such	entities	are	epistemically	objective	or epistemically	subjective,	i.e.	whether	the	means	for	making	judgments	about	these entities	suffices	to	make	those	judgments	true. 4. Conclusion In	summary,	whether	one	is	discussing	social	groups,	social	constructions,	or	any other	social	entity,	realists	appeal	first	and	foremost	to	the	Explanatory	Argument. According	to	this	argument,	if	our	best	explanations	posit	social	entities,	then	we ought	to	believe	that	these	entities	exist.	However,	explanatory	pessimists	cite science's	history	of	failed	explanations	as	evidence	against	this	contention. Fictionalists	also	challenge	this	realist	doctrine	by	claiming	that	we	can	use	social entities	in	our	best	explanations	without	believing	in	their	existence. The	Explanatory	Argument	also	asserts	that	our	best	explanations	posit social	entities.	Paying	special	attention	to	social	groups	reveals	two	challenges	to this	claim.	First,	eliminativists	claim	that	statements	about	social	groups	are	false, and	should	be	replaced	by	statements	about	individuals.	Second,	reductionists	claim that	statements	about	social	groups	are	trivially	true,	because	they	are	really	just shorthand	for	statements	about	individuals.	In	neither	case	do	our	best	explanations posit	social	entities. Yet	another	aspect	of	realism	concerns	the	objectivity	of	social	entities.	As	we saw,	realists	hold	that	social	entities	are	epistemically	objective,	in	the	sense	that	a group's	or	person's	ideas	about	a	social	entity	could	be	wrong.	Constructivists,	by contrast,	claim	that	(at	least	some)	social	entities	are	epistemically	subjective, meaning	that	ideas	about	those	entities	determine	what	they	are. A	number	of	options	and	questions	suggest	themselves.	Can	realism	in	the social	sciences	be	justified	without	the	Explanatory	Argument?	Can	the	challenges	of eliminativism	and	reductionism	extend	to	social	entities	other	than	groups?	If	social entities	are	not	real,	why	bother	studying	them?	What	would	social	scientists	lose	by adopting	one	(or	more)	of	the	antirealist	stances	canvassed	above?	Given	the	variety of	positions	available,	there	is	ample	room	for	having	nuanced	ontological	positions in	the	social	sciences. Notes 15 1	We	would	like	to	thank	Lee	McIntyre,	Gioia	Pappalardo,	Jeremy	Read,	and	an anonymous	referee	for	their	assistance	with	this	project. Related	Topics Kuhn's	Influence	on	the	Social	Sciences;	Explanation;	Reductionism;	Methodological Individualism;	Naturalism;	Collective	Intentionality;	Social	Ontology;	Critical Realism;	Objectivity;	Social	Construction	of	Knowledge References Berger,	Peter	L.,	and	Thomas	Luckmann	(1991),	The	social	construction	of	reality:	A treatise	in	the	sociology	of	knowledge.	London:	Penguin	UK. Blalock,	Hubert	M.	(1971),	Causal	models	in	the	social	sciences.	Chicago,: Aldine*Atherton. Blau,	Peter,	and	Otis	Dudley	Duncan	(1967),	The	American	occupational	structure. New	York:	Wiley. Block,	N.	J.	(1976),	"Fictionalism,	Functionalism	and	Factor	Analysis",	in	R.	S.	Cohen, C.	A.	Hooker,	A.	C.	Michalos	and	J.	W.	Van	Evra	(eds.),	PSA	1974:	Springer Netherlands,	127-141. Bloor,	David	(1976),	Knowledge	and	social	imagery.	London	;	Boston:	Routledge	&	K. Paul. Boghossian,	Paul	(2006),	Fear	of	knowledge	:	against	relativism	and	constructivism. Oxford:	Clarendon	Press. Bourdieu,	Pierre,	and	Loïc	J.D.	Wacquant	(1992),	An	invitation	to	reflexive	sociology. Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press. Churchland,	Paul	M.	(1985),	"The	ontological	status	of	observables:	In	praise	of	the superempirical	virtues",	in	P.	M.	Churchland	and	C.	A.	Hooker	(eds.),	Images of	science:	essays	on	realism	and	empiricism	with	a	reply	from	Bas	C.	van Fraassen,	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	35-47. Colander,	David	(1996),	Beyond	Microfoundations:	Post	Walrasian	Economics: Cambridge	University	Press. Comte,	Auguste	(1868),	The	positive	philosophy	of	Auguste	Comte.	New	York:	W. Gowans. de	Mesquita,	Bruce	Bueno,	James	D.	Morrow,	Randolph	M.	Siverson,	and	Alastair Smith	(1999),	"An	Institutional	Explanation	of	the	Democratic	Peace", American	Political	Science	Review	93	(4):791-807. Demeter,	Tamás	(2013),	"Mental	Fictionalism",	The	Monist	96	(4):483-504. Denzin,	Norman	K.	(2001),	"The	reflexive	interview	and	a	performative	social science",	Qualitative	Research	1	(1):23-46. Dupré,	John	(1993),	The	disorder	of	things	:	metaphysical	foundations	for	the	disunity of	science.	Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press. Durkheim,	Emile	(2013),	Durkheim:	The	Rules	of	Sociological	Method:	And	Selected Texts	on	Sociology	and	Its	Method.	Translated	by	W.	D.	Halls.	2nd	ed. Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan. Elster,	Jon	(2007),	Explaining	Social	Behavior:	More	Nuts	and	Bolts	for	the	Social Sciences.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. 16 Friedman,	Milton	(1953),	"The	methodology	of	positive	economics",	in	Milton Friedman	(ed.),	Essays	in	positive	economics,	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago Press,	5-43. Garfinkel,	Alan	(1981),	Forms	of	explanation:	rethinking	the	questions	in	social theory.	New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press. Gilbert,	Margaret	(1989),	On	Social	Facts.	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press. Gove,	Walter	R,	Michael	Hughes,	and	Carolyn	Briggs	Style	(1983),	"Does	marriage have	positive	effects	on	the	psychological	well-being	of	the	individual?", Journal	of	health	and	social	behavior:122-131. Hacking,	Ian	(1983),	Representing	and	intervening:	introductory	topics	in	the philosophy	of	natural	science.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. ---	(1985),	"Do	we	see	through	a	microscope?",	in	P.	M.	Churchland	and	C.	A. Hooker	(eds.),	Images	of	science:	essays	on	realism	and	empiricism,	with	a reply	from	Bas	C.	Van	Fraassen,	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago,	132-152. Haslanger,	Sally	(2012),	Resisting	Reality:	Social	Construction	and	Social	Critique. Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Hedström,	Peter	(2005),	Dissecting	the	social:	On	the	principles	of	analytical sociology.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. Kincaid,	Harold	(1986),	"Reduction,	explanation,	and	individualism",	Philosophy	of Science	53	(4):492-513. ---	(2008),	"Structural	Realism	and	the	Social	Sciences",	Philosophy	of	Science	75 (5):720-731. King,	Gary,	Robert	O	Keohane,	and	Sidney	Verba	(1994),	Designing	Social	Inquiry: Scientific	Inference	in	Qualitative	Research.	Princeton:	Princeton	University Press. Kuhn,	Thomas	S.	(1996),	The	structure	of	scientific	revolutions.	3rd	ed.	Chicago,	IL: University	of	Chicago	Press.	Original	edition,	1962. Latour,	Bruno	(1987),	Science	in	action:	how	to	follow	scientists	and	engineers through	society.	Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press. Latour,	Bruno,	and	Steve	Woolgar	(1986),	Laboratory	life	:	the	construction	of scientific	facts.	2nd	ed.	Princeton,	N.J.:	Princeton	University	Press.	Original edition,	Beverly	Hills	:	Sage	Publications,	1979. Laudan,	Larry	(1981),	"A	confutation	of	convergent	realism",	Philosophy	of	Science 48	(1):19-49. Law,	John	(2004),	After	method:	Mess	in	social	science	research.	New	York: Routledge. Lewis,	Oscar	(1975),	Five	families:	Mexican	case	studies	in	the	culture	of	poverty.	New York:	Basic	Books. List,	Christian,	and	Philip	Pettit	(2011),	Group	agency:	The	possibility,	design,	and status	of	corporate	agents.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. MacDonald,	Paul	(2003),	"Useful	fiction	or	miracle	maker:	The	competing epistemological	foundations	of	rational	choice	theory",	American	Political Science	Review	97	(04):551-565. MacKenzie,	Donald	A,	Fabian	Muniesa,	and	Lucia	Siu	(2007),	Do	economists	make markets?:	on	the	performativity	of	economics:	Princeton	University	Press. 17 Mill,	John	Stuart	(1904),	A	system	of	logic,	ratiocinative	and	inductive	:	being	a connected	view	of	the	principles	of	evidence	and	the	methods	of	scientific investigation.	8th	ed.	New	York:	Harper. Pickering,	Andrew	(1984),	Constructing	quarks:	a	sociological	history	of	particle physics.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press. ---	(1995),	The	mangle	of	practice:	time,	agency,	and	science.	Chicago:	University of	Chicago	Press. Psillos,	Stathis	(1999),	Scientific	realism:	how	science	tracks	truth.	London: Routledge. Quinton,	Anthony	(1975),	"The	Presidential	Address:	Social	Objects",	Proceedings	of the	Aristotelian	Society	76:1	viii. Reed,	Isaac	(2008),	"Justifying	Sociological	Knowledge:	From	Realism	to Interpretation",	Sociological	Theory	26	(2):101-129. Root,	Michael	(2000),	"How	we	divide	the	world",	Philosophy	of	Science	67:S628S639. Rosen,	Gideon	(1994),	"Objectivity	and	Modern	Idealism:What	is	The	Question?1", in	Michaelis	Michael	and	John	O'Leary-Hawthorne	(eds.),	Philosophy	in	Mind, Dordrecht:	Springer	Netherlands,	277-319. Searle,	John	R.	(1995),	The	construction	of	social	reality.	New	York:	Free	Press. Stanford,	P.	Kyle	(2006),	Exceeding	Our	Grasp:	Science,	History,	and	the	Problem	of Unconceived	Alternatives.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Sundstrom,	Ronald	R.	(2002),	"Race	as	a	human	kind",	Philosophy	&	Social	Criticism 28	(1):91-115. Sveinsdóttir,	Ásta	(forthcoming),	"Social	Construction",	Philosophy	Compass. Thatcher,	Margaret	(2015),	Interview	for	Women's	Own	magazine,	31	October	1987 1987	[cited	December	1	2015].	Available	from http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106689. Tuomela,	Raimo	(1990),	"Methodological	individualism	and	explanation", Philosophy	of	science:133-140. Turner,	Stephen	P.	(2003),	"What	Do	We	Mean	by	'We'?",	Protosociology	18-19:139162. van	Fraassen,	Bas	C.	(1980),	The	scientific	image.	New	York:	Clarendon	Press. ---	(1989),	Laws	and	symmetry.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Wann,	Daniel	L.,	Merrill	J.	Melnick,	Gordon	W	Russell,	and	Dale	G	Pease	(2001),	Sport fans:	The	psychology	and	social	impact	of	spectators:	Routledge. Weber,	Max	(1978),	"Economy	and	society",	in,	Berkeley:	University	of	California Press. Worrall,	John	(1989),	"Structural	Realism:	The	Best	of	Both	Worlds?",	Dialectica	43 (1-2):99-124. Wylie,	Alison	(1994),	"Reasoning	About	Ourselves:	Feminist	Methodology	in	the Social	Sciences",	in	Michael	Martin	and	Lee	C.	McIntyre	(eds.),	Readings	in	the Philosophy	of	Social	Science,	Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	611-624. Further	Reading Brock,	Stuart,	and	Edwin	David	Mares.	2007.	Realism	and	Anti-Realism.	Montreal: McGill	Queens	University	Press,	especially	Chapters	1	through	3,	provide	a	lucid 18 introduction	to	general	issues	about	realism	and	antirealism.	Leplin,	Jarrett,	ed. 1984.	Scientific	realism.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	provides	a relatively	comprehensive	survey	of	the	realism-antirealism	debate	as	it	plays	out	in general	philosophy	of	science,	though	the	different	contributors	tend	to	use	naturalscientific	examples.	Lipton,	Peter.	2004.	Inference	to	the	Best	Explanation,	2nd	ed. New	York:	Routledge	carefully	presents	the	main	explanatory	pessimist	arguments, and	offers	detailed	responses	to	them.	Risjord,	Mark	(2000),	Woodcutters	and witchcraft:	rationality	and	interpretive	change	in	the	social	sciences.	Albany:	State University	of	New	York	Press	shows	how	ideas	very	similar	to	Lipton's	can	be applied	to	the	social	sciences.	Sainsbury,	R.	M.	2010.	Fiction	and	fictionalism.	New York:	Routledge	is	a	good	introduction	to	fictionalism,	while	Mäki,	Uskali,	ed.	2002. Fact	and	Fiction	in	Economics:	Models,	Realism	and	Social	Construction.	Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press	discusses	fictionalism	with	respect	to	economics. Further	discussions	of	eliminativism,	reductionism,	and	group	realism	include Ritchie,	Katherine.	2015.	"The	Metaphysics	of	Social	Groups."	Philosophy	Compass 10:	310-321	and	Tuomela,	Raimo.	2013.	Social	ontology:	Collective	intentionality	and group	agents.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	Further	discussions	of	social constructivism	include	Hacking,	Ian.	1999.	The	social	construction	of	what? Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press;	Mallon,	Ron.	2007.	"A	Field	Guide	to Social	Construction."	Philosophy	Compass	2:	93-108;	and	Sismondo,	Sergio.	1993. "Some	Social	Constructions."	Social	Studies	of	Science	23:	515-553.